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Frowttr lonoris R pitum
Rights and Their Critics
Cass R Sunstein
The Bill of Rights has now been part of the United States
Constitution for more than two hundred years. In the recent past,
that short document has inspired reform movements throughout
the world-not merely in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania,
Poland, and East Germany, but in such places as South Africa,
China, and Taiwan as well. It is therefore nothing short of remarkable that the international interest in the Bill of Rights has come
at a time when the very concept of rights, or of a polity pervaded
by rights, is under attack in the United States.
The attack on rights has sometimes been highly influential. It
underlies a prominent new journal, The Responsive Community, and
it cuts across ideological lines.' Justice Clarence Thomas has delivered a passionate and widely reported plea for responsibilities
instead of rights.' In so saying, Justice Thomas echoed a general
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence and Co-Director
of the Center on Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago Law School
and Department of Political Science. Some parts of this essay originally appeared in Cass
R. Sunstein, Rightalk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1991, at 33 (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)).
1 See, e.g., AM1TAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrI: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); PHILIP K. HOwARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.
(1993); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). Various challenges to rights can be found in the journal founded by Professor Etzioni, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY. See, e.g., The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1991/92, at 4, 18-20 (listing 57 signatories to the platform).
Something with parallel concern, I believe, underlies RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE
PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994), and also CHRISTINA HOFF
SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM? HOW WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN (1994). A helpful
recent discussion can be found in Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE
LJ. 989 (1994).
2 Justice Clarence Thomas, The Rights Revolution and America's Urban Poor Vic-
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claim about the pathologies of legal practices during the Warren
Court era. More generally, it is urged that a culture of rights encourages a form of selfishness and an unwillingness to compromise
that are incompatible with citizenship.' Along related but distinct
lines, academic critics have suggested that aggressive judicial review
or perhaps judicial review itself, protecting identified rights, is by
its nature incompatible with democracy.4
These various claims have received hospitable receptions in
prominent places. Many of the Supreme Court's recent decisions
embrace the idea that the creation of rights can be destructive to
democratic governance. 5 The attack on "substantive due process"
reflects this claim quite vividly.' In recent deliberations, Congress
and the executive branch have been increasingly attentive to the
view that government, instead of recognizing rights, should encourage people to exercise greater responsibility.7 On this view,
those who are disadvantaged should take their welfare into their
own hands and should not expect assistance from government
operating in response to claims of right. Moreover, it is said, those
who are advantaged should respond not to rights laid down by the
state, but to their own sense of responsibility to people in need. If
the 1960s and the early 1970s were an era of rights, it seems likely
that the 1990s will be a period in which responsibilities move
increasingly to the fore.

tims or Beneficiaries?, Address Before the Federalist Society and the Manhattan Institute
(May 16, 1994), in 60 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 514, 514-17 (1994); see also, e.g., Neil
A. Lewis, Justice Thomas Assails Victim Mentality, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at A14.
3 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 1-17; CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF
THE MASSES (1995).
4 See, from diferent angles, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PO-

LITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975 (1993); Jeremy Waldron, Freeman's

Defense of Judicial Review, 13 LAW & PHIL. 27 (1994); Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993).
5 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
6 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95 ("There should be, therefore,
great resistance to expand the substantive reach of th[e Due Process] Clauses, particularly
if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the
Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express

constitutional authority.").
7

See, e.g., R.

SHEP MELNICK,

BETWEEN THE LINES:

INTERPRETING WELFARE

RIGHTS

274-83 (1994); President Bill Clinton, Address Before the National Baptist Convention
(Sept. 9, 1994) (describing a "crisis of values" and a "lack of individual responsibility");

Dan Quayle, The Poverty of Values, Address Before the Commonwealth Club of California (Sept. 8, 1994) ("[O]ur public policy today, unfortunately, reflects a philosophy of
rights and entitlements rather than responsibility.").
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RIGHTS AND THEIR CRITICS

Many critics of rights observe that American political debate,
especially since the New Deal, has come to center on a bewildering and proliferating array of "rights"-that it has yielded to a
kind of "rights revolution" involving the courts, Congress, and the
President.' These rights, many of them quite novel, include a
wide range of safeguards for criminal defendants; prevention
against the abuse and neglect of children; guarantees to improve
the treatment of the mentally and physically disabled;9 protection
of consumers from sharp practices; and a remarkable array of
efforts to safeguard the environment." To be sure, some people
think that the growing list of rights is an important or precious
social achievement, supplementing a catalog of protected interests
started but hardly finished in the founding period. But many
others disagree. They believe that America's transformation into
"the land of rights" has had harmful, even disastrous consequences.

12

My goal in this Essay is to disaggregate and to evaluate the
claims now brought against rights. I suggest that much of the
attack is based on confusion and on a failure to make necessary
distinctions. The attack is best aimed at particular rights, not at
rights as such. In its usual form, it depends on a misunderstanding of what rights are and of what they do. It rests on empirical
claims that are hard to support. It offers a cultural diagnosis that
is only part of a complex picture, for there has been no general
shift to rights from responsibilities.
In the end, I claim that the critique of rights has no merit as
such, and that the plausible claims that it contains should be stated far more cautiously and narrowly. When so stated, the claims
can be discussed as part of a debate over which rights it is best to
have, rather than as a debate over whether rights are pernicious
merely by virtue of being rights.
This Essay comes in three parts. Part I tries to separate the
various components of the attack on rights. Part II identifies some

8 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 4-7; HOWARD, supra note 1, at 116-33; Thomas,
supra note 2.
9 See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 7, at 41-51.
10 See, e.g., CAS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 11-46 (1990).
11 See the various views catalogued in MELNICK, supra note 7. This way of viewing
things builds on President Roosevelt's plea for a second bill of rights. See infra note 84
and accompanying text.
12 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 1-17; see also Thomas, supra note 2.
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truths in this attack, but shows that most of these truths are partial. Part III deals with an increasingly important question-the
relationship between rights and responsibilities.
I.

THE CHARGES

Numerous charges have been made against rights, and it will
be useful to begin by separating distinct claims that tend to be
run together. We might disaggregate the charges into six different
categories.
A.

The Social Foundations of Rights

Some people suggest, as part of their critique of rights, that
rights are essentially social and collective in character and that the
rhetoric of rights obscures this point.1 3 For example, rights come
from the state in the sense that they depend for their existence
on collective institutions. 4 Without the law of property, set out by
the collectivity, property rights cannot be secure. Without the law
of contract, saying that agreements are enforceable under certain
conditions, contracts could not exist in the way that we understand them. In the critics' view, many claims based on rights, and
especially claims for individual rights, tend to disguise the social
character of rights and in particular the need for collective and
communal support. 5 The result, it is said, is confusion and an
inability to draw lines between rights that are desirable from the
social point of view and rights that are not.
B.

The Rigidity of Rights

Other critics charge that rights have a strident and absolutist
character, and that for this reason they impoverish political discourse. 6 Rights do not admit of compromise. They do not allow
room for competing considerations. For this reason, they impair
and even foreclose deliberation over complex issues not realistical-

13 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 83-88. The point emerges from legal realist
work. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923).
See a related discussion, from a different angle, in JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165-255 (1986).
14 The point is made well, though hardly as part of a critique of rights, in JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 61 (1992).
15 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 83-88.
16 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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ly soluble by simple formulas. Rights thus have many of the defects of rules. t7 A person claiming a right-for example, a handicapped person claiming that all buildings should be accessible to
people who use wheelchairs-may not be willing to allow a process
of balancing in which we judge, for example, whether accessibility
for wheelchairs really makes sense in light of the relevant costs
and benefits. A characteristic problem with rules is that they do
not permit people to make individual judgments about whether
following the rules really is reasonable in particular cases. 9 Rights
have the identical problem.
Rooted in nineteenth-century ideas of absolute sovereignty
over property, rights are said to be ill-adapted to what we usually
need, that is, a careful discussion of trade-offs and competing concerns. If rights are (in Ronald Dworkin's suggestive and influential
phrase, criticized below) "trumps,"20 they are for that very reason
harmful to the difficult process of accommodating different goals
and considerations in resolving such thorny problems as abortion,
the environment, and plant closings.
C. Indeterminacy
In one of his greatest aphorisms, Justice Holmes wrote that
"[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases."2 ' Rights,. of
course, take the form of general propositions. For this reason they
are said to be indeterminate and thus unhelpful.22
If we know that there is a right to private property, we do not
know whether an occupational safety and health law or a law requiring beach access is permissible. In fact, we know relatively
little. Standing by itself, the constitutional protection against govemnment "takings" tells us very little about how to handle particular problems. This is true of rights generally. To say that there is a
right to equal protection of the law is not to say, for example,
that affirmative action programs are acceptable, mandatory, or
prohibited. In fact, the right to equal protection of the law re-

17 See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 1,at 116-33.
18 See id. at 113-18.
19 See EUGENE BARDACH1 & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
20 RONALD DWORKIN, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("Individual rights are
political trumps held by individuals.").
21 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1371-76.
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quires a great deal of supplemental work to decide cases. The
right must be specified in order to have concrete meaning. The
specification will depend on premises not contained within the
announcement of the right itself.3 Rights purport to solve problems, but when stated abstractly-it is claimed-they are at most
the beginning of a discussion.
Perhaps the area of free speech is the most vivid illustration.
Everyone agrees that such a right exists; but without supplemental
work, we cannot know how to handle the hard questions raised by
commercial speech, libel, obscenity, or campaign finance restrictions. A serious problem with modern free speech discussions is
that the term "free speech" tends to be used as if it handled the
hard questions by itself.24
D. Excessive Individualism
A different objection is that rights are unduly individualistic
and associated with highly undesirable characteristics, including
selfishness and indifference to others.25 Rights miss the "dimension of sociality;"" they posit selfish, isolated individuals who assert what is theirs, rather than participating in communal life.
Rights, it is said, neglect the moral and social dimensions of important problems.
The important and contested right of privacy, for example, is
said to have emerged as an unduly individual right, rooted in the
"property paradigm" and loosened from connections to others.
Critics urge that this conception of the issues involved in the
so-called privacy cases misses crucial aspects of the relevant problems-abortion, family living arrangements, and the asserted right
to die. Such issues do not involve simple privacy; they call up a
range of issues about networks of relationships, between individuals and the state, between individuals and families, between individuals and localities. Perhaps the abortion issue is especially problematic when conceived in terms of a "right to privacy." Many
people, on both sides of the abortion controversy, are uncomfortable with the "privacy" rhetoric. Inattentive to the unborn or to

23 See Henry Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems,
19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 306 (1990).
24 This is a problem in NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH,
SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).

25
26
27

See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 75, 178; Tushnet, supra note 1.
See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 109-44.
See id. at 20-25, 48-50.
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the situation of mothers, American law has been said to have,
perversely, left the pregnant woman genuinely alone, without people "willing to help her either to have the abortion she desired, or
to keep and raise the child who was eventually born."'
Similarly, American law is said to be unequipped even to
describe the harms faced by a community destroyed by the closing
of a plant employing most of its members. These harms include
the loss of a rich neighborhood life-"roots, relationships, solidarity, sense of place, and shared memory . . . ."' On the critics'
view, the individualistic character of recent formulations has left
Americans with a crucial linguistic and conceptual deficiency.
Rights talk is a principal culprit. Since rights are claimed by individuals, it is said, rights promote and encourage a community
whose members think of social problems in the most narrow,
self-interested terms.
E. Protection of Existing Distributionsand Practices
To some critics, a key problem with rights is that they tend to
be used for what the critics see as pernicious ends. Partly because
rights are indeterminate in the abstract, they can be used as an
excessively conservative and antidemocratic force, protecting existing distributions from scrutiny and change."' Some people think
that the historical function of rights has been to insulate current
practice from legitimate democratic oversight. Thus the Fifth
Amendment was invoked to protect slavery before the Civil War;31
thus the Fourteenth Amendment was used to attack social welfare
legislation in the early part of this century;, 2 thus the First
Amendment is used to invalidate campaign finance legislation 3
today.4
On this view, rights are too readily invoked in the service of
goals that are unworthy or that at least should be subject to democratic rather than judicial resolution. A key problem with rights is

28 Id. at 58.
29 Id. at 30; see also Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (1988).
30 See KENNEDY, supra note 1; Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1371-82; cf J.M. Balkin, What
Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?,90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992).
31 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34 For a broadside attack on judicial invocation of rights, see generally Becker, supra
note 4.
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that they are brought in the service of existing distributions of
authority and power.
F. Rights Versus Responsibilities
A final and especially prominent objection is that the emphasis on rights tends to crowd out the issue of responsibility. In
American law and in American public discourse, some critics complain, it is too rare to find the idea that people owe duties to
each other, or that civic virtue is to be cultivated, prized, and
lived. Rights, and especially new protections of rights since the
1960s, are said to be a major problem here.
In a simple formulation: People who insist on their rights too
infrequently explore what it is right to do. Or they become dependent on the official institutions charged with safeguarding rights,
rather than doing things for themselves. The controversy over
whether rights turn women or blacks into a "dependent class" is in
part about this issue. 5 People who insist that their status as victims entitles them to enforce their legal rights may not conceive
of themselves in ways that engender equality and equal citizenship.
Thus Justice Thomas has objected to the "judicial revolution
in individual rights," and has challenged as harmful "the idea that
our society had failed to safeguard the interests of minorities, the
poor and other groups; and, as a consequence, was, in fact, primarily at fault for their plight."36 Justice Thomas particularly lamented the fact that "[ m ]any began questioning whether the poor
and minorities could be blamed for the crimes they committed."37 In his view, "[o]ur legal institutions and popular culture
began identifying those accused of wrong doing as victims of upbringing and circumstance."' This was unfortunate, for "[i]n the
long run, a society that abandons personal responsibility will lose
its moral sense. And it is the urban poor whose lives are being
destroyed the most by this loss of moral sense." 9 According to
Justice Thomas:
The very same ideas that prompted the judicial revolution

35 See, e.g., KATHERINE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFrER: FEAR, SEX AND FEMINISM ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES (1993); SOMMERS, supra note 1.
36 Thomas, supra note 2, at 516.

37
38

Id.
Id.

39

Id. at 517.
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...and that circumscribed the authority of local communities

to set standards for decorum and civility on the streets or in
the public schools also made it far more difficult for the criminal justice system to hold people responsible for the consequences of their harmful acts."
When black people insist on rights and "demand ...from [their]
oppressors [] more lenient standards of conduct," they produce a
state of dependency worse than slavery."
Professor Mary Ann Glendon, an especially prominent and
evenhanded critic of rights, is similarly concerned about the effects of rights on responsibilities.4 2 Thus Glendon devotes a good
deal of space to the "duty to rescue," a duty not recognized by
American law.43 If a person ignores someone who is drowning, he
will not be held accountable, even if rescue could occur with little
effort. Glendon deplores this result, arguing at a minimum for a
statement, in law, that such a duty exists. On Glendon's view, it is
important to attend to responsibility as well as rights. American
law does this far too infrequently.
Along similar lines, Glendon challenges the view (on which
the current Supreme Court is increasingly insistent4 ) that the
Constitution imposes no affirmative duties on government. She
suggests, though with some ambivalence, that police officers
should be obliged to protect people from serious threats and that
social workers should have a duty to protect children from domestic violence when they are on notice that such violence will occur.
Above all, Glendon fears that judicial decisions that fail to recognize these duties have harmed public discourse and social understandings. The important point is the general one: Critics of rights
argue that the emphasis on rights diminishes individual commitments to duty and responsibility.
II.

CONCEPTS AND PARTIAL TRUTHS

In this section, I attempt to clarify some of the conceptual
issues at stake in the critique of rights. I suggest as well that the

40
41

42
43
44
(1989)
where

Id. at 516.
Id. at 517.
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 76-108.
Id. at 78-89.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(The Due Process Clause "confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even
such aid may be necessary to secure life.").
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critique embodies some limited and partial (and important)
truths, but that it does not by any means support a general challenge to rights.45 The critics of rights have, in short, misconceived
their target.
A.

Definitional Issues

Begin with a definition of rights. This is a regrettably complex
issue, and I will have to deal with it briefly and tentatively here."
Sometimes the term "rights" is intended to refer to important
human interests, or (what is not the same thing) to those interests
that operate as "trumps" in the sense that they cannot be compromised by reference to collective policies or goals. If we identify
rights with important human interests, the critique of rights loses
its force. Who could object to social protection of important human interests?
The conception of rights as interests that operate as "trumps"
against the collectivity raises more difficulty, largely because it is
not clear that this conception is really helpful. The first problem
is that almost every right is defeasible at some point, and defeasible just because the collective interest is very strong. In American
law, no right is absolute. If, for example, the rest of the human
race will be eliminated because of the protection of a right, the
right will certainly be redefined or legitimately infringed, probably
under some version of the "compelling interest" test. The real
question then becomes when rights are defeasible because of collective justifications-under what conditions and for what reasons.
The formula of "trumps" is misleading for this reason. We need to
know what sorts of reasons are admissible and how weighty they
must be; these are the key questions in the exploration of rights.
Rights characteristically limit the kinds of arguments that can
be used by way of justification, and they characteristically require
justifications of special weight.47 Above all, rights exclude certain

45 For similar assessments, see McClain, supra note 1, at 990-94.
46 For an especially instructive discussion of the definition of rights, see RAZ, supra
note 13, at 165-92.
47 See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Reasons: Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law,
45 HASrINGS LJ. 711 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). Note that it is important to inquire into two different dimensions-legitimacy and weight. Some grounds for infringing on rights are inadmissible even
if they are weighty. Thus, racial prejudice is not a legitimate reason for racial discrimination, and offense at the content of ideas is not a legitimate reason for infringing on free
speech.
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 736 1994-1995

1995l

RIGHTS AND THEIR CRITICS

otherwise admissible reasons for action. 8 But ideas of this kind
do not support the "trumps" metaphor and indeed lead in quite
different directions.
The second problem is that. many conceptual puzzles are
raised by the understanding of rights as interests operating
"against" the collectivity. Often rights are something that the
collectivity recognizes and protects in order to protect its interests.
If this is so, there is no easy opposition between rights and the
collectivity. In fact many rights are best understood as a solution
to a collective action problem and especially to a prisoner's dilemma faced by people lacking legal entitlements; property rights
themselves have this character. 9 Rights are collectively conferred
and designed to promote collective interests. They are protected
by social institutions for social reasons. In such cases, rights may in
a sense operate against the collectivity once they are conferred;
government may not take property just because it wants to do so.
But even in such cases, rights are guaranteed in the first instance
both by and for the collectivity (which of course has no existence
apart from the individuals who compose it).
In any case, many people who are insistent on rights do not
see rights as opposing the collectivity, at least not in any simple
sense. Rights often have the purpose of creating a certain kind of
society. Consider here Joseph Raz's suggestion:
If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys
freedom of expression, but not having the right myself, or
enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would
have no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is
better served by the first option."
The point suggests that many rights deserve to exist because of
their collective consequences.
This idea can be embraced by people from diverse perspectives; I offer some truncated remarks. Utilitarians would be likely
to make a large space for rights, because the protection of identified interests as rights can promote utility. There is no tension
between utilitarianism and rights, though the utilitarian account of
rights is distinctive and controversial.5 Economic analysts of law
See the discussion of exclusionary reasons in JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND
35-48 (2d ed. 1992).
See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 3.
JOSEPH RAZ, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALrIY OF LAW AND POLITICS 29, 39 (1994).
51 SeeJONATHAN RILEY, LIBERAL UTILITARIANISM 150-80 (1988); see also RAZ, supra note
48
NORMS
49
50
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are hardly critical of rights. On the contrary, they take rights to be
crucial instruments for promoting economic goals. 2 Those who
emphasize the need to base social and legal practices on a conception of the human good, or of human flourishing, will also
make room for rights insofar as rights can be shown to be a method of promoting human flourishing. Under this view, a conception of the good is prior to a conception of the right; but rights
are a crucial part of the good, or a crucial way of achieving the
good, for purposes of both theory and practice.
Some people associate rights with "nature."54 The natural
rights tradition is, to say the least, a complex one, and I cannot
sort out its various claims here. But some of those who point to
"nature" should probably be understood to say that certain distinctly human characteristics and capacities call for or fit with a
certain category of rights. If social and legal practices must be
based on the natural capacities of human beings, we might be led
to embrace a set of rights that promote those capacities. 5 Perhaps people who espouse this view will see natural rights as worthy
of respect whatever the particular community may think. That
claim may be correct, but it does not oppose rights in any simple
sense to the collectivity. Many of the rights sought by the natural
law tradition have everything to do with sociality and its preconditions.-5
Of course deontological writers offer a very different conception of rights, seeing them not as instruments for maximizing
utility or wealth, or as a way of promoting the best conception of
the human good, but as reflecting respect for individuals as persons.57 Here we may indeed have an opposition between the individual and the community. Under this conception of rights, it
remains necessary to justify any particular understanding of rights,
and thus to offer reasons for their existence. But perhaps those

50, at 32 (criticizing the utilitarian account of rights); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11
PHIL. & PUB. A. 3 (1982).
52 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 1-15 (4th ed. 1992).
53 See, e.g., AMARiYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 44-58 (1992); Martha Nussbaum,
Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 228-240 (R. Bruce Douglass et
al. eds., 1984).
54 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1988).
55 This conception of rights emerges from id.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 212. An important claim for duties rather
than rights emerges from ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF
KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1989).
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reasons need not refer to collective goals. On the other hand,
some (broadly speaking) deontological writers do insist on the
collective goals that underlie rights, suggesting that rights have
their origin in such goals."8
Let us put these conceptual difficulties to one side and define
rights in a way that should be congenial to both supporters and
critics of rights: Rights are legally enforceable instruments for the
protection of their claimants. Rights are thus practical instruments
that can be invoked in courts of law by individuals or groups
against both private parties and the state. (To say that rights operate against society is not to say that their justification is not social.
Rights operating, against society may have social justification; consider the right to free speech or the right to private property.)
This is a highly pragmatic conception of rights, one that tries to
put philosophical issues to one side and to identify instead the
actual functions of rights in the world. I think that it is this understanding of rights, and not the contested theoretical issues, that
underlies the critique of rights.
B. Republicanism, Liberalism, and Rights
Now shift to the place of rights in American constitutionalism.
A good deal of work in constitutional law has dealt with the role
of "republican" thought in the American tradition." The republican ideal prizes a deliberative conception of democracy-one in
which popular sovereignty entails not simple majoritarianism, but
an effort to ensure a form of reason-giving in the public sphiere. °
Efforts to revive the republican tradition have been designed in
part to oppose the view that the protection of antecedently given
"rights" is the sole purpose of the American constitutional tradition. On the contrary, the notion that rights are antecedently
given leads to real confusion. Many rights are protected as such
because they are a precondition for democratic deliberation,"

58 For a particularly illuminating discussion, see RAZ, supra note 13, at 165-80.
59 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
60 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTroN 17-21 (1993).
61 Many but not all rights are necessary for democratic deliberation. See James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993).
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 739 1994-1995

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

and in any case the American constitutional order seeks deliberation about ordinary issues not implicating rights at all.
Some people think that liberalism and republicanism are at
odds' and that rights have a natural place in liberalism but an
awkward one in republican thought. But there is no opposition
between the liberal tradition and the republican tradition as these
have operated in the United States; and republicanism is hardly
hostile to rights. To be sure, we could generate conceptions of
republicanism that are opposed to liberalism, and vice versa. A
conception of republicanism that distrusts rights altogether, or that
sees duty to the community as an overriding obligation of all citizens, 63 or that seeks to impose a unitary conception of the good,
would indeed be antiliberal. Moreover, a conception of liberalism
that sees politics as an effort to aggregate private preferences
would indeed be antirepublican, since it would place no premium
on deliberation or civic virtue. But the aspiration to deliberative
democracy can certainly be understood in such a way as to be
both liberal and republican. The liberal tradition is committed to
the justification of government outcomes by reference to reasons 64 and also to a form of government by discussion.'
Some critics of the "republican revival" think that republicanism and rights are at odds. On this view, republicanism is "ominous" insofar as it prizes democratic deliberation and downgrades
private rights.' But this is a misreading of the republican tradition. The Framers of the Constitution were certainly republicans,
and they certainly believed in rights. Modern forms of republicanism are enthusiastic about rights. If deliberation and citizenship
are desirable, rights of free speech, for example, seem indispensable, and we may be led to guarantee rights of religious liberty,67
rights of private property, and rights in the criminal justice sys-

62 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
63 See Sunstein, supra note 59, at 40 n.51 (discussing Benjamin Rush's proposal for
teaching each citizen "that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public
property").
64 See the discussion of public reason in JOHN RAWLS, POLrIcAL LIBERALISM 216-20
(1993).
65 See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERAuSM (1993).
66 See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1991).
67 See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
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tem-and also to protect the rule of law, a constraint on government power that seems a precondition for citizenship.s
Of course a commitment to republicanism-a vagu6 and general creed capable of many diverse specifications-does not lead to
any particular constellation of rights. But republicans are likely to
make much use of rights to promote their own deepest ideals.
C. Truths and Partial Truths
From the previous discussion we can see a wide range of
strands in the challenge to rights. The challenge is highly eclectic.
Moreover, there are some truths in many of these points, and it
will be useful to explore those truths.
Of course rights do depend for their existence on collective
institutions. As we know them, rights require public protection
and support.69 Protection of the individual-of property or person-cannot easily occur without collective help." But this descriptive point is hardly an argument against rights. Many good
things depend for their existence on collective institutions, and
this is not an argument that those things are bad. Economic prosperity, a pluralistic culture, sufficient quantities of nutrition, housing for all or most, freedom from violence, racial equality, low
rates of unemployment-all these are, under imaginable conditions, secured best or only with collective help. They are no less
desirable for that."

68 I discuss some of these issues in Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and
Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 907 (1993).
69 An important qualification comes from ROBERT ELuICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW
(1991) (showing that social norms, with law-like functions, can emerge spontaneously).
70 Self-help remedies are of course imaginable, but they would likely lead to much
more fragile protection of property and person than modem polities seek.
71 The general point is made by the greatest critic of socialism in the twentieth
century, Friedrich Hayek:
It is regrettable, though rot difficult to explain, that in the past much less attention has been given to the positive requirements of a successful working of
the competitive system than to these [previously discussed] negative points. The
functioning of a competition not only requires adequate organisation [sic] of
certain institutions like money, markets, and channels of information-some of
which can never be adequately provided by private enterprise-but it depends
above all on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as
possible . . . . In no system that could be rationally defended would the state
just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed
and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other.
FRIEDRIGH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM

28-29 (1946).
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It is also important to point out that references to rights can
make for unduly rigid understandings of complex problems and
can sometimes stop discussion in its tracks before analysis has even
started. Claims of right often have the vices of rules. Even worse,
rights can be conclusions masquerading as reasons. In thinking
about claims of right, it is often necessary to be detailed and concrete about the social consequences of competing courses of action. The invocation of "rights" can be a serious obstacle to this
process. Consider, for example, the current debates over regulation of the electronic media, violent pornography, hate speech at
universities, or advertising for cigarettes. To say that any restriction
on these forms of expression violates the "right to free speech"
may in the end be correct; but this requires a long and complex
argument, not a shorthand phrase. The claim of a "right to free
speech" is far too general and abstract to support the argument.
Here it does seem important and true to say that rights, stated
abstractly, do not solve concrete cases. They are indeterminate
until they are specified.
As they operate in law, rights generally are specified. Hence
the rights protected by the Constitution and the common law are
far from indeterminate, however hard it is to know what they are
when stated abstractly. The claim of indeterminacy is for this reason far too broad. The problem, to which the critics have correctly drawn attention, lies in the use of general claims of right to
resolve cases in which the specification has not yet occurred.
It is also true that efforts to think about many social and
economic problems in terms of rights can obscure those problems.
A claimed right to clean air and water or to safe products and
workplaces makes little sense in light of the need for close assessment, in particular cases, of the advantages of greater environmental protection or more safety, as compared with the possible accompanying disadvantages-higher prices, lower wages, less employment, and more poverty. Perhaps the legal system will create
rights of a kind after it has undertaken this assessment. But to the
extent that the regulatory programs of the 1970s were billed as
simple vindications of "rights," they severely impaired political
deliberation about their content and about the necessity for tradeoffs.72
It seems correct too to say that civic virtue-responsibility to
one's neighbors and to one's nation-is an important part of
72

I attempt to defend this claim in SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 74-110.
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citizenship. This is an aspect of citizenship that is notoriously neglected in public discussion and social practice. Whether rights are
the culprit here may be questioned. But insofar as rights are understood in purely self-iAterested terms, it is certainly conceivable
that they can crowd out issues of responsibility.
Nor should it be denied that rights, can protect existing distributions and practices. Many rights, particularly those associated
with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, have
been so understood for many years.7' But this is hardly a challenge to rights. Whether rights do have this function depends not
on their status as rights but on what, particularly, rights are. And
whether rights should protect existing distributions 'and practices
cannot be decided in the abstract. Such protection is not always a
bad idea. Whether it is justified depends on the appropriate
weight to be given to the interests in stability and expectations,
and on the merits of those distributions and practices. This is a
complex matter that cannot be resolved a priori.
D. Confusions and Misconceptions
Despite the various partial truths in the attack on rights, there
is a pervasive problem in that attack: Rights need not have the
functions or consequences that they are alleged to have. The challenge to rights is properly directed against certain kinds of rights,
not against rights in general. At most, the challenge to rights
creates a contingent, partial warning about the appropriate content of rights and about the possibly harmful role of certain social
institutions safeguarding rights. It is not what it purports to be,
that is, a general claim about rights as a social institution. More
specifically, the current devaluation of rights suffers from two
serious problems. Both of these problems are products of some
pervasive confusions.
Many critics of rights complain about what they see as a cultural shift from the 1960s, in which rights have crowded out responsibilities.74 Simply as a matter of cultural description, the
claim is far too crude. In some areas, including for example sexuality, it is plausible to say that a belief in private autonomy has
73

See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); Cass R- Sunstein, Sexual Orientation

and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988).
74 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 1-17.
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prevailed at the expense of a commitment to responsible behavior.
But in other areas, the last few decades have witnessed an increase
in social and legal responsibilities and a decreased commitment to
rights. Consider, for example, cigarette smoking; corporate misconduct; air and water pollution; sexual harassment; and racist and
sexist speech. In all of these areas, people who were formerly
autonomous, and free to act in accordance with their own claims
of right, are now subject to socially and sometimes legally enforced responsibilities. We have seen, in the last few decades, a
redefinition of areas of right and a redefinition of areas of responsibility. I do not intend to celebrate these redefinitions, but only
to suggest that purely as a matter of description, there has been
no general shift from responsibility to rights.
Now turn from description to evaluation. The first problem is
that whether rights are associated with excessive individualism, with
excessive self-interest, or with anything else that is excessive depends on what rights specifically are. It should go without saying
that rights are designed to protect human beings,75 each of
whom is an individual; but this cannot be a complaint of the
critics of rights. Instead, many such critics seem to object that
rights are associated with pernicious forms of individualism and
self-interestedness. But this is not the case. To take two examples,
the right to subsistence and the right to environmental quality-whether or not these should be codified in law-do not seem
to promote selfishness. Both rights might be products of altruism,
and may promote altruism and even feelings of responsibility. In
fact many rights are designed to encourage precisely the forms of
deliberation and communal interaction that critics favor. A wide
range of protected interests count as "rights," and the critics fail
to make some important distinctions among diverse legal instruments.
The second problem is that the critics seem to think that the
explosion of "rights talk" accounts for certain social failures, including failures of social responsibility. This is far too simple a
claim. In fact, the opposite is as likely true-failures of social responsibility give rise to assertions of rights. In any case, the
claimed association depends on empirical claims that are highly
speculative and that lack clear support.

75 I mean to put to one side and not to assess the question whether nonhuman
creatures or objects should have rights, for the ultimate protection of human beings or
for other reasons.
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1. Diverse Rights
The two problems can be brought together if we attend to a
familiar conceptual confusion. 6 Often critics write as if rights and
responsibilities are opposed, or as if those who favor the former
are completely different from those who favor the latter. As they
see it, rights are individual, atomistic, selfish, crude, licentious,
antisocial, and associated with the Warren Court. Responsibilities,
on the other hand, are seen as collective, social, altruistic, nuanced, and associated with appropriate or traditional values. But
this understanding is quite inadequate, for some rights lack the
characteristics claimed for them, and other rights have the features associated with responsibilities."'
For example, the right to freedom of speech may be owned
by individuals, but it is a precondition for a highly social process,
that of democratic deliberation. That right keeps open the channels of communication; it is emphatically communal in character.
It ensures a sine quo non of sociality, an opportunity for people
to speak with one other. Indeed, everyone who owns a speech
right does so partly so as to contribute to the collectivity; it is this
fact that explains the government's inability to "buy" speech rights
even when a speaker would like to sell.7' So too, the right to
associational freedom is hardly individualistic. It is meant precisely
to protect collective' action and sociality.
Consider another time-honored liberal right, the right to a
jury trial. This right is far from atomistic. Quite the contrary, it
ensures a role for the community in adjudicative proceedings.79
The right to religious liberty protects individuals (surely this does
not count against the right), but it is also designed to protect the
collectivity by ensuring social peace and thus by making democracy
possible."0 The right to vote, also owned by individuals, protects

76 A related confusion is embodied in the notion that rights posit a wholly autonomous, asocial "subject." Rights do no such thing. They are political instruments with no
necessary metaphysical foundation.
77 See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights As A Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131,
1201-10 (1991) (discussing the nonatomistic character of most rights at the founding
period).
78 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 79 CAL. L. REV. 889,
914-16 (1986).
79 See Amar, supra note 77, at 1182-99.
80 See Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 19 (ion Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 745 1994-1995

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

collective processes of governance. The right to be free from racial
discrimination, protected against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, is not antisocial. It ensures communal decency by
protecting against the exclusion of subordinated groups. The right
to be free from racial discrimination also guarantees a form of
sociality.
Even the right to property can be understood not as a method for protecting self-interested acquisition (though it does have
this function), but instead as an indispensable condition for citizenship, a collective goal and a collective good.8 1 If property can
be taken at the government's whim, people are not likely to have
the independence and the security that will permit them to criticize the government openly. More generally, we have seen that
the right to private property solves a collective action problem
faced by everyone in the state of nature, and in that sense, supplies what is both technically and nontechnically described as a
collective good.
At this stage we can make the Hohfeldian"2 point too often
neglected by many critics of rights: In an important sense, rights
and duties imply each other." They are correlative. To say that
someone has a right is usually to say that someone else has a duty.
If Jones has a right to property, other people have a duty not to
trespass on what Jones owns. If Smith has a right to be free from
racial discrimination in employment, employers have a duty to
ignore the color of Smith's skin. The right not to be murdered
imposes a duty on people not to take the lives of others. Rights
are not opposed to responsibilities. On the contrary, rights are
responsibilities.
Not only do rights create duties, but the imposition of a duty
also serves to create a right. If X is under a duty not to discriminate or not to trespass, people dealing with X possess certain
rights. Most duties create a correlative right. Return, in this connection, to one of Professor Glendon's special concerns-the question whether we should create a duty to help others. That duty
seems to be a classic communal responsibility, far removed from
the legalistic world of rights. But appearances are misleading.

81 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-30 (1988) (discussing the
diverse functions of the right to property).
82 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913).
83 A qualification emerges from RAZ, supra note 13, at 170-71, but the qualification
does not seem important to my purposes here.
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Indeed, Glendon's discussion comes close to an argument not only
for a new duty, but also for a new right: a right to assistance, to
be granted to vulnerable people and held by them against both
other people and the government. Glendon herself refers to
Franklin Roosevelt's proposed "second bill of rights," which included the right to adequate food and clothing, to a decent
home, to adequate medical care, to good education, and to a
useful and remunerative job. 4 Of course these are rights and
their invocation represents a form of "rights talk," but they certainly and emphatically reflect a sense of collective responsibility.' They are not associated with self-interest, or at least not (in
any simple sense) with the self-interest of those who must respect
them.
It is perfectly possible that any such second bill of rights
would be a bad idea. That is not my point. No one should deny
that the proliferation of rights may be unfortunate or worse; too
many rights may even contradict one another. The new Eastern
European Constitutions are an unfortunate illustration." I am not
attempting to defend any particular system or set of rights, but instead suggesting something far simpler: Since rights tend to imply
responsibilities simply as a matter of logic, and vice versa, it is not
easy to understand the claim that American law needs responsibilities rather than or in addition to rights.
The claimed opposition between rights and responsibilities
faces some additional difficulties as well. Rights of the most traditional sort, including property, may be the necessary condition for
enabling a sense of collective responsibility to flourish. People
without rights to their property may be so dependent on official
will that they cannot exercise their responsibilities as citizens.
Moreover, a principal characteristic of totalitarian states is the
endless cataloguing of responsibilities owed by citizens to the state.
The Soviet Constitution was an ignoble example. For example,
that Constitution created a duty "to make thrifty use of the

84 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32,
41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1969); see also GLENDON, supra note 1, at 104.
85 The suggestion that responsibility should be exercised instead of legal compulsion
is taken up in Part III infra.
86 See Cass R. Sunstein, Something 014 Something New, E. EuR. CONST. REv., Spring
1992, at 18.
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people's wealth,""7 "to preserve and protect socialist property,"'
to "work conscientiously," 9 and "to concern themselves with the
upbringing of children."9 The Soviet Constitution offers a cautionary note against enthusiasm for responsibilities, at least if these
are to be treated as an explicit, legally codified concern of the
state (putting the Hohfeldian point to one side)."
These points suggest a broad conclusion about the recent
criticism of rights. Those who believe in more reflective public
deliberation are making an important point; we have far too little
such deliberation, and part of the problem involves unduly simple
arguments based on alleged rights. But the critics should not
claim to be making so general a criticism of rights. Instead, they
should offer a fine-grained account allowing people to identify
both the sorts of interests that cannot be intruded on without
special justification and the sorts of institutions that should protect
various interests. Surely such an inquiry will justify a redescription
of certain interests in terms that have nothing to do with rights or
that treats rights not as axiomatic but as the outcomes of a complex set of judgments. For example, consider the problems of
environmental protection and plant closings. 2 But it is equally
certain that many "rights" will survive in their current state.
2.

Constitutional Rights and Judicial Review

It is important to insist that such an inquiry will suggest that
the category of human rights is not coextensive with the category
of constitutional rights or the category of judicially enforceable
rights. Constitutional rights qualify as such for special and partly
contingent reasons, having to do with institutional issues and with
the reasons for distrust of ordinary politics in the particular nation.9" Constitutional rights are usually and rightly thought to
have a "vertical" dimension, allocating power between the government and the individual. But they also have an important "horizontal" dimension, allocating power among different branches of
government by, for example, granting authority to the judiciary

87 Id. (Article 61).
88 Id.
89 Id. (Article 60).
90 Id. (Article 65).
91 See id. at 18-19.
92 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 29-30, 111-12.
93 See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 TEx. L. REv.
305 (1993).
HeinOnline -- 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 748 1994-1995

1995]

RIGHTS AND THEIR CRITICS

that might otherwise be exercised by the legislature. The horizontal allocation requires some justification in terms of the different
capacities of different institutions.
Many critics are speaking to the issue of institutional character, complaining about courts, not about rights.94 But there is often a solid justification for a constitutional and also judicial role in
the protection of rights. Under plausible assumptions, the institution of constitutional rights will survive as an invaluable one, especially to the extent that such rights can safeguard interests that are
at excessive risk in ordinary politics. It is also likely, in many imaginable situations, that the institution of judicial review will survive
as well.95 Many prominent critics of judicial review are making
conceivably but only contingently convincing empirical claims
about the likely inclinations and character of judges." They are
not doing what they purport to be doing, that is, showing a general incompatibility between judicially vindicated constitutional rights
and democracy. Often such rights promote democracy, and are
not antithetical to it.97 The 'attack on an excessive judicial role
should be separated from the attack on rights as such.
3.

The Legal System and Its Pathologies

Perhaps these basic arguments would not entirely satisfy many
critics of rights. Perhaps they would want to characterize the problem as the constant resort to the legal system as a remedy for
social ills, rather than the use of public deliberative processes and,
best of all, of self-help and nongovernmental institutions. In the
last generation we have seen quite absurd claims of right in cases
involving the law of tort and the law of the Constitution. Is it
unconstitutional-invasive of right-for government to require
people to wear helmets when they ride motorcycles?" Many people think that such questions are rhetorical and that such cases
give rights a bad name.

94 See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 81.
95 There is of course a difference between constitutional rights and judicially enforceable constitutional rights; some constitutional rights might be enforceable only
through politics.
96 See WALDRON, supra note 81.
97 The classic statement is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST (1980).
98 See, e.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 920
(1989).
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It may therefore be the peculiar interaction between American individualism, American law, and "rights talk," rather than
rights themselves, with which critics are most concerned. On this
view, the problem is not so much rights in general, but rights
claims that deny obligations to others, that ignore the possibility
that private actors can and should take care of themselves, and
that are associated with immaturity, personal self-interest, hedonism, and the short term. To the extent that the critics seek to
revive a richer and more differentiated kind of public debate and
to emphasize the need for greater attention to the possibilities
and obligations of private organizations, they are entirely persuasive. The mind-numbingly familiar oppositions of matched legalistic rights-pro-life versus pro-choice, associational freedom versus
nondiscrimination,
business autonomy
versus
employment
rights-are part of the culture of the soundbite, which provides no
help to those seeking to think through or to assist people with
complex realities.
But it is important to sort out the relationships between
"rights talk" and "the impoverishment of political discourse. " '
Some critics suggest that political discourse is in significant part a
creature of what happens with courts and law."0 But this is an
empirical claim, and it may not be true. To be sure, political discourse is often impoverished, and correctives for the current situation should be a principal concern of current reformers. This is a
central issue for modern democracies. If one looks at the prominent places for political discussion-say, the television and most
popular radio stations-one will find little deliberation and little
serious attention to public issues, and such attention as there is
appears sensationalistic, prurient, sentimental, and banal.'
Sometimes the banality consists of reflexive claims about rights.
Important questions, however, remain: To what extent can
this phenomenon be attributed to "rights talk" within the judiciary
and the legal system? By what mechanism has "rights talk" produced problems in public deliberation? Can an association be
shown? Careful work has shown that many arguments about the
social effects of judicial decisions tend to be overstated, specula-

99
100

GLENDON, supra note 1, at x.

See, e.g., id. at 87, 105.

101 See, e.g., GASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
For a helpful discussion of American traditions in this respect, see JOSEPH M. BESSETrE,
THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 1-39 (1994).
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tive, or without much support. 11 2 The current situation-of inadequate democratic deliberation-is not clearly traceable to judicial
protection of rights. On the contrary, it is far more plausibly a
product of the system of education and the demands of the
broadcasting market."° If the critics' concern is with impoverished political discourse, they might focus on the incentives,
norms, and practices of those who impart political information-on their responsibilities, and on the legal framework, or
rights, under which they undertake those responsibilities.
There is enormous room for reform here, drawing on experience in other nations and involving changes both in private sector
practices and in the regulatory system governing the media.",4
For example, the government might offer larger subsidies to high
quality broadcasting or encourage more attention to public issues
through licensing policies. It might offer guidelines or recommendations designed to work against the culture of the soundbite. It
might attempt to encourage opinion polls that involve public deliberation rather than quick and often ill-considered individual
reactions." 5 All this seems plausible. What I am questioning is
the suggestion that "rights" are a major culprit here. On the contrary, rights of some sort are likely to be an important part of any
effort to improve public deliberation.
III. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES REVISITED
I have suggested that many of the most enthusiastic and vivid
challenges to rights are based on the idea that the American emphasis on rights, and perhaps especially on legal rights, has caused
a weakened sense of social responsibility. The Hohfeldian
point-that rights impose responsibilities, while responsibilities
create rights-severely complicates this idea. But putting that point
to one side, we should acknowledge that an insistence on people's
rights ought not to disparage people's responsibilities. This idea
could perhaps qualify as a twenty-first-century analogue to the
Ninth Amendment.' Certainly we should keep in mind the important point that people may have a right to do something that

102 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1990).
103 See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-82 (1994).
104 See id. at 80-82.
105 SeeJAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991).
106 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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they would be irresponsible to do. Or to put things another way,
it may be very wrong to exercise one's rights.
Indeed, it is unquestionably objectionable to engage in much
conduct that one has a right to do. Some platitudes are worth
repeating: We may have a right to say offensive things, even grotesquely offensive things, but most people do not and should not
exercise that right very often. People may have a right to treat
each other in many disrespectful ways, but disrespectful treatment
is not for that reason acceptable. An extremely wealthy person has
a right to keep all his money (after taxes), and to give none of it
to charity, but selfishness and hoarding are not to be applauded.
A lawyer has a right to refuse to do pro bono work, but lawyers
should generally do pro bono work.
The point bears particularly on the controversial issues of
pregnancy and abortion. Under the Constitution, women have a
right to have abortions. But it is important to insist that this is a
right that ought not to be exercised, or to have to be exercised,
very often, and that in a society with 1.5 million abortions per
year, something is extremely wrong. Even people who favor the
abortion right ought to be clear that an abortion is a tragic event
and that steps should be taken to make abortions rare. In the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule Roe v.
Wade," 7 it is perfectly appropriate for people on all sides of the
issue to shift public debate in the direction of ways to minimize
the incidence of abortion. Efforts to discourage pregnancies that
will result in abortions, and even to discourage abortion itself
through moral suasion, should not, as a general rule, be taken as
unfortunate interferences with a "right," even if some such efforts
might be rejected as punitive or discriminatory.
However we may think about this heated subject, the example
demonstrates the basic point that a nation ought not to say that
because people have a legal right to do something, society and its
various components have no business complaining about people
who exercise that right, or engaging in moral disapproval of people who do what they have a right to do. On the contrary, a large
part of moral education consists of the inculcation of norms and
values that discourage harmful or offensive behavior even though
it is not unlawful. One possible pathology of a culture of rights is
that people will think that because they have a right to do X, they
cannot be criticized or blamed for doing X. This conclusion ap-

107

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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pears to have become common with respect to free speech, where
speakers sometimes complain that it is objectionable even to chal08 A
lenge them for engaging in offensive or degrading speech."
well-functioning' culture distinguishes legal censure from moral
censure. It allows people the freedom to do many things that are
properly criticized on moral grounds.
The point bears on recent claims by Justice Thomas and other critics of rights. Justice Thomas is concerned that an emphasis
on what people have a right to do has produced a kind of moral
relativism and standardlessness where right-holders insist on their
rights and do not pause to evaluate whether their conduct is valuable to themselves or to society. Justice Thomas is particularly
troubled that the grant of rights can make people, and especially
disadvantaged people, think of themselves as victims, whose basic
goal is to assert their claims and to seek protection from government. On this view, the recognition of rights can generate forms
of dependency, self-pity, and lack of initiative that are extremely
damaging to rights-holders themselves. Ideas of this sort have also
played a role in recent arguments, sometimes made by
self-proclaimed feminists countering certain prominent feminist
claims-with the critics urging that the emphasis on, for example,
rights against sexual harassment and pornography has encouraged
women to join a cult of victimhood, in which equality and
self-respect become all the more difficult to obtain. 109
The fear of an association between the recognition of legal
rights and failures in responsibility and self-help seems plausible in
many settings. People who lack rights to desirable goods
may-from fear, self-interest, or sheer desperation-engage in
socially productive conduct. (Of course they may engage in unproductive and even dangerous conduct instead.) For example, there
is a familiar and wholly reasonable fear that a "right to welfare"
could discourage productive labor. It is possible too that people
who think of themselves as victims, needing and enforcing rights,
will fail to engage in activity that is ultimately rewarding to themselves and to society as a whole.

108 For example, some people have claimed "censorship" in response to Senator Paul
Simon's attempts to monitor televised violence. See, e.g., Raymond L. Fischer, Is It Possible
to Regulate Television Violence?, USA TODAY, July, 1994 (Magazine), at 72 (describing the
ACLU's position that "violent speech has been protected by the First Amendment for
more than 50 years" and media organizations' opposition to the "momentum building in
Washington for censorship as a solution to violence").
109 See SOMMERS, supra note 1; STROSSEN, supra note 24, at 119-40, 179-215.
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These claims are, however, empirical ones, and they are quite
speculative. They cannot be credited in the abstract. Whether they
are true, and in what settings they are true, requires much more
work than has been supplied thus far. Indeed, the converse phenomenon may occur, with recipients of rights conceiving of themselves as anything but victims and helpless. Perhaps people who
are given rights-to own property, to be free from segregation, to
be free from sexual harassment-will be more likely to conceive of
themselves as receiving and deserving equal respect. It is surely
plausible that the recognition of rights often converts people from
victims into citizens. Certainly a major point of rights guarantee is
to do precisely this.
In an important respect, moreover, the critique of rights in
favor of responsibilities seems to have things backward. Rights
claims are often a response to a failure of social responsibility
rather than a cause of individual irresponsibility. We might look
again at the abortion problem, which, for many, exemplifies the
hazards of rights-based approaches." ° To be sure, it does seem
inadequate to think of abortion in terms of a right to "privacy"-a
word that does not appear in the Constitution at all and that in
any case fails to come to grips with the abortion question. To
oppose the abstract "right to life" to the equally abstract "right to
choose" is entirely unhelpful. As many people have suggested, a
social goal might be not to protect an abstract right to choose,
but instead to develop methods to protect unborn life while simultaneously providing help and support for mothers.'
If we acknowledge all this, how, if at all, might the abortion
right be justified? The answer has everything tq do with social context and with failures of social responsibility. Under conditions of
equality on the basis of sex and without. widespread poverty, the
argument for an abortion right would be far weaker." 2 Surely it
is correct to say that in a society in which duties to the vulnerable
were taken seriously, the case for a right to abortion would be
much less plausible than it now is. In such a society, men as well
as women would be required (by social norms and perhaps by

110 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 58-66, 164-68.
111 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987);
Michael W. McConnell, Religion and the Search for a Principled Middle Ground on Abortion,
92 MICH. L. REv. 1893 (1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)).

112 This is one lesson of Glendon's work, though it is not a lesson that Glendon
draws herself. See GLENDON, supra note 111.
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law) to devote their bodies to the protection of their children. In
such a society, women who need help would get help-before,
during, and after pregnancy." In such a society, the existence of
social assistance would argue against the right to abortion, by
making child-bearing and child-rearing less difficult and less a
source of inequality than it now is for many women.
Most important, in such a society restrictions on abortion
would be based on a general and neutral form of compassion for
the vulnerable, rather than the now pervasive desire-prominent,
though (I emphasize) by no means universal, in the pro-life movement-to control women's reproductive capacities, and by means
of that control to prescribe traditional gender rules through law,
and in that way to continue a system of discrimination that is
based on sex.
I have described a society in which any right to abortion
might seem puzzling or even unnecessary. This is not, of course,
the society in which we live. If one looks at the context in which
restrictions on abortion take place-at their real purposes and
their real effects-the abortion right is most plausibly rooted not
in privacy but in the right to equality on the basis of sex. I cannot
fully support the claim here," 4 but a few points, bearing on the
nature of rights claims in general, may be suggestive.
Current law does not compel men to devote their bodies to
the protection of other people, even if life is at stake, and even if
men are responsible for the very existence of those people. Many
studies have shown that current restrictions on abortion could not
be enacted without the active support of those who believe that
such restrictions are an important means of reasserting traditional
gender roles."- Of course such support is not barred by any legitimate theory of democracy, but it suggests that the relevant laws
are in fact founded in significant part (though certainly not universally) in prejudice. And under current conditions, women who
need social assistance or (at least equally important) help from
fathers do not get nearly enough-not merely during pregnancy,
but before and after as well.
If this is the case, the very existence of the abortion right can
be seen as a response to a failure of social responsibility. The

113 See id. at 53-58 (discussing the European practice of care for pregnant women).
114 See SUNSrEJN, supra note 60, at 270-85, for a more complete discussion of this
claim.
115 See, e.g., KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
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right cannot be justified in the abstract-its existence owes everything to context. In this lies a large lesson. Rights often emerge
precisely because of the refusal of private and public institutions
to recognize and to carry out their duties. When the environment
is badly degraded, when the most vulnerable people are left to
fend for themselves, or when children are at risk, it should be
unsurprising to find vigorous if apparently odd claims for "rights."
The claims for a right to clean air and water, to food, to a decent
place to live, to a safe workplace, to children's rights, or to "free
reproductive choice'"-all these must be understood in their context, as responses to failures of social responsibility.
Critics of rights are sometimes persuasive in asserting that
rights-based arguments can obscure the problems at hand. It is
very plausible to think that vulnerable people should not have a
legally enforceable right to freedom from everything to which they
are vulnerable, in part because such a right could impair responsibility. It is very plausible to think that instead of emphasizing a
right to abortion, we should alter the social conditions that make
abortion attractive or necessary. Arguments on behalf of rights can
simplify complex issues, beg important questions, and treat issues
involving trade-offs among competing goals as soluble through
easy formulas. But it would be unfortunate if plausible objections
to rights-based thinking were taken as a reason to ignore or to
disparage those who are proclaiming their rights, rather than to
improve the conditions that have made it necessary for people to
resort to proclamations of rights in the first place.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There have been many different strands in recent critiques of
rights. Some of those strands point to legitimate concerns. We can
identify rights claims that are genuinely absurd, and it is important
to acknowledge that a society pervaded by rights may be pathological. My basic point here is that the category of rights is extremely
broad and that for this reason, no general critique of rights will
make much sense. Those who blame "rights" have misdescribed
their real target. In the last generation, morever, there has been
no general shift from responsibilities to rights. Instead there have
been multiple particular shifts in both directions.
Some rights are a precondition for social interaction. Rights
are not opposed to responsibilities, at least not in any simple way;
rights are responsibilities. Rights need not be associated with excessive self-interest or excessive individualism. The real question is
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not whether we should have rights, but what rights we should
have. Some of what I have discussed here bears on that question,
but to make much progress on it, much more will have to be said
about both values and facts. I conclude with the suggestion that
we should cease discussing -whether rights are desirable and cease
opposing rights to responsibilities. We should embark instead on
the more fine-grained task of deciding what categories of rights
are appropriate in what settings.
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